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Co:NFLicr OF LAws-FuLL FAITH AND CRBDrr-FoRBIGN CusTODY DE·

crums - Husband and wife were domiciled in Wisconsin. When marital
troubles developed, the parties agreed that the wife should. take their children
to Ohio and. there decide on her future action. Shortly afterward the wife
informed the husband. she was not returning. The husband secured. a divorce
in Wisconsin, with the decree purporting to award. him custody of the
children subject to visitation rights in the wife. Service on the wife was
· obtained by publication, but she made no appearance in the Wisconsin proceedings. After one of the visits of the children, the wife refused. to return
them and. the husband filed a petition for habeas corpus1 in Ohio, relying
upon the Wisconsin decree. The Ohio intermediate appellate court affirmed
the probate court's order that the wife give up the children, holding that
Wisconsin had jurisdiction to render a binding decree since it was the children's domicile.2 The state supreme court dismissed an appeal.3 On certiorari,
the United States Supreme Court held, reversed, three justices dissenting.
Where a court lacks personal jurisdiction over a parent, its decree cutting off
the parent's immediate right to custody of minor children need. not be accorded.
full faith and. credit. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 73 S.Ct. 840 (1953).
The Supreme Court has never squarely decided. whether a foreign custody
decree is entitled. to full faith and. credit under the Constitution,4 and. the
present case leaves that question still unresolved. However, of the eight
participating justices only Justice Frankfurter, concurring, voiced. a .Bat objection to the application of traditional full faith concepts to child custody
decrees. To six justices the case presented. the familiar issue of what constitutes
the requisite jurisdictional basis to :render a decree binding on other states.I>
Two of these justices believed. that domicile of the child plus that of one parent
suffices;6 while not disputing that domicile of the child. is necessary, the other
four decided that there must also be personal jurisdiction over the parent sought
to be bound.7 In the instant case that parent had. possession of the child.
outside the jurisdiction purportedly awarding custody, but the Court is not
wholly clear about the significance of this fact.8 The division within the
1 Under Ohio procedure the writ of habeas corpus "tests only the immediate right to
possession of the children." Principal case at 532; In re Corey, 145 Ohio St. 413, 61 N.E.
(2d) 892 (1945). In some states the court may determine the future custody of the children
in a habeas corpus proceeding. See, e.g., People of State of New York ex rel. Halvey v.
Halvey, 330 U.S. 610, 67 S.Ct. 903 (1947).
2 Anderson v. May, 91 Ohio App. 557, 107 N.E. (2d) 358 (1951).
a Anderson v. May, 157 Ohio St. 436, 105 N.E. (2d) 648 (1952).
4 U.S. CONST., art. IV, §1. See People of State of New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey,
note I supra; Ehrenzweig, ''Interstate Recognition of Custody Decrees," 51 l\hCH. L. REv.
345 at 356-357 (1953).
G Justice Minton, dissenting, thought the jurisdictional question was not properly raised
and that the Wisconsin decree was entitled on its face to full faith and credit.
6 Justices Jackson and Reed, dissenting.
7 Justice Burton delivered the opinion of the Court, joined in by Chief Justice Vinson
and Justices Black and Douglas.
8 It has been held that where the child is outside the state a court cannot render a
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Supreme Court is mirrored in state decisions and textual writing. The Restate1nent, to which the majority of the courts at least pay lip service, declares

that only the state of the child's domicile has jurisdiction to make a binding
custody award.9 This view is based on the theory that custody is a matter of
status to be controlled by the state of domicile,10 but it is open to the serious
objection that the technical rules of domicile may not provide a realistic
determination of the state most interested in the child's welfare.11 Some courts,
emphasizing the claims of the parents, maintain that personal jurisdiction over
the parents is sufficient regardless of the domicile or whereabouts of the child.12
Others stress the position of the state as parens patriae and hold that residence
or physical presence of the child within the state confers jurisdiction to award
custody.13 Legal writers have challenged the reliability of these "rules," asserting
that a scrutiny of the actual holdings of the cases shows: (1) courts of any
states having a substantial interest in the welfare of the child exercise concurrent jurisdiction to determine custody;14 and (2) although such courts
feel free to change custody awards, they will generally enforce a foreign decree
where non-enforcement would benefit a parent with "unclean hands."10 While
binding custody award without personal jurisdiction over both parents. Carter v. Carter,
201 Ga. 850, 41 S.E. (2d) 532 (1947). See May v. May, 233 App. Div. 519, 253 N.Y.S.
606 (1931). In neither of these cases was the court explicit as to the state of the child's
domicile. Cf. Weber v. Redding, 200 Ind. 448, 163 N.E. 269 (1928) (award not binding
where child was neither domiciled nor present in the jurisdiction).
OCoNPLICT OF LA.ws Rl!STA.T.El\lENT §117 (1934); GOODRICH, CoNPLICT OF LA.ws,
3d ed., 421 (1949); Duryea v. Duryea, 46 Idaho 512, 269 P. 987 (1928); Callahan v.
Callahan, 296 Ky. 444, 177 S.W. (2d) 565 (1944); annotation, 9 A.L.R. (2d) 434
(1950). Generally there is also personal jurisdiction over both parents. But see Minick
v. Minick, 111 Fla. 469, 149 S. 483 (1933) (court awarded custody where child domiciled
in forum was residing with absent parent).
1o Goodrich, "Custody of Children in Divorce Suits," 7 CoRN. L.Q. 1 at 2-3 (1921).
11 Stansbury, "Custody and Maintenance Law Across State Lines," IO LA.w .AND CoNT.BM.
Pnon. 819 at 820-823 (1944). In extreme cases the child has never lived in the state of
domicile. Pieretti v. Pieretti, 13 N.J. Misc. 98, 176 A. 589 (1935).
12 Anderson v. Anderson, 74 W.Va. 124, 81 S.E. 706 (1914); May v. May, note 8
supra (dictum).
13 De la Montanya v. De la Montanya, 112 Cal. 101, 44 P. 345 (1896); Kenner v.
Kenner, 139 Tenn. 211, 201 S.W. 779 (1918) (upholding foreign decree rendered in ex
parte proceeding); see Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 148 N.E. 624 (1925); annotation,
4 A.L.R. (2d) 7 (1949). This view finds support in STW,D!BRG, CoNPLICT OF LA.ws, 2d
ed., 327 (1951).
14 Stansbury, "Custody and Maintenance Law Across State Lines," 10 LA.w AND
CoNTE.M. Pnon. 819 at 831-832 (1944). See Stafford v. Stafford, 287 Ky. 804, 155 S.W.
(2d) 220 (1941); Sampsell v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. (2d) 763, 197 P. (2d) 739 (1948).
The substantial interest necessary to support a state's concurrent jurisdiction might be domicile or residence of the child. See 50 MrcH. L. REv. 602 (1952); 9 A.L.R. (2d) 434 at
441-442 (1950).
la Ehrenzweig, "Interstate Recognition of Custody Decrees," 51 M:rCH. L. REv. 345
esp. at 357 et seq. (1953). See also McMillin v. McMillin., 114 Colo. 247, 158 P. (2d)
444 (1945); Ex parte Mullins, 26 Wash. (2d) 419, 174 P. (2d) 790 (1946); Stansbury,
"Custody and Maintenance Law Across State Lines," IO LA.w AND CoNT.SM. Pnon. 819
at 829 (1944). Query as to the im1>0rt of the Court's reference in the principal case at
535, n. 8, to the "special considerations" that arise when a parent acts in bad faith.
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the result of the principal case could be justified on these bases, the reasoning
of the Court is unlikely to lessen the confusion in a field sorely in need of
clarification. The majority opinion is ambiguous,16 and seems to uphold the
applicability of the full faith and credit clause to child custody decrees through
an uncritical acceptance of the authority of cases involving property rights
and the marital status.17 Most regrettably, the Court concerns itself primarily
with the claims of the parents rather than with the welfare of the child.18 It
thus ignores what are really the two chief competing policy factors in this area:
the need to protect the child from endless litigation over his custody, and the
need to enable custody awards by the court most qualified at any given time
to determine the child's best interests. Apparently experience has convinced
the courts that the second factor is paramount.19 Since this is so it would
seem desirable to limit the possible applicability of the full faith and credit
clause in custody cases by making prior adjudications binding only on the
parents, leaving the forum state free as parens patriae to look after the welfare
of the child.20 It might be questioned whether this distinction is much more
than a verbalism, but at least it may satisfy the Supreme Court's full faith
requirements until an ultimate solution is found for the custody problem.21
Treating the award of a child's custody like a judgment for alimony payments
is hardly such a solution.
Theodore]. St. Antoine¥ S.Ed.

16 Justice Frankfurter thought the Court was deciding that Ohio need not enforce the
WISConsin decree; Justice Jackson, that Ohio must not enforce it.
17 The state of the plaintiff's domicile may make a binding dissolution of the man:iage
status, Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 63 S.Ct. 207 (1942), but per..onal
jurisdiction over the defendant is necessary to terminate a spouse's right under a prior alimony decree, Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 68 S.Ct. 1213 (1948). Only Justice Frankfurter deemed a custody decree unique and governed by neither of the foregoing rules.
18 It is axiomatic that the child's welfare is the principal consideration in custody cases.
MADDEN, DoMEsnc Rm.AnoNs 369 (1931). The approach of the Court in the present
case may have been influenced by the scope of habeas coi:pus proceedings in Ohio. See
note 1 supra.
19 See notes 14 and 15 supra. See also State v. Ricketson, 221 La. 691, 60 S. (?d) 88
(1952). Cf. In re Bort, 25 Kan. 308 (1881); Commonwealth ex rel. Rogers v. Daven, 298
Pa. 416, 148 A. 524 (1930) (repudiating full faith doctrines in custody cases so far as the
state is concerned). And note the readiness with which the courts :find "changed circumstances" in order to circumvent the foreign decree. GooDRICH, CoNPLicr OP LA.ws, 3d ed.,
423 (1949).
·.
20Jn general, this was the view in Wear v. Wear, 130 Kan. 205, 285 P. 606 (1930).
But see 81 Umv. PA. L. REv. 970 (1933).
21 UDifoxm legislation providing for interstate cooperation between courts acting on
their own initiative has been suggested. Ehrenzweig, ''Interstate Recognition ol: Custody
Decrees," 51 MICH. L. R:sv. 345 at 372-374 (1953).

